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Peter N. Duinker* In Search of "Compass and Gyroscope":
Where Were Adaptive Management and
Principled Negotiation in Nova Scotia's
Forest-Strategy Process?
In his landmark 1993 book entitled Compass and Gyroscope: Integrating Science
and Politics for the Environment, Kai Lee outlined the need for stronger processes
in support of sustainable development. The science of adaptive management
and the politics of principled negotiation were offered as the most promising
approaches. The author uses these concepts to evaluate the process used to
develop Nova Scotia's natural resources strategies of August 2011, specifically
the forest strategy following the Environmental Goals and Sustainable Prosperity
Act. The findings show that, by comparison with similar policy-development
processes used elsewhere in Canada, the Nova Scotia process lacked both
foresight (drawing on adaptive management) and stakeholder consensus
(drawing on principled negotiation). The author advocates for stronger analytical
and political strategic processes in future policy development in the province.
Dans son important ouvrage de 1993 intituld < Compass and Gyroscope:
Integrating Science and Politics for the Environment - (Boussole et gyroscope:
intdgrer la science et la politique pour Ienvironnement), Kai Lee affirme qu'il est
n6cessaire de mettre en place un processus solide A l'appui du d6veloppement
durable. // avance que la science de la gestion adaptative et la politique des
ndgociations axdes sur la collaboration sont les mdthodes les plus prometteuses.
L'auteur se fonde sur ces concepts pour 6valuer le processus utilis6 dans
l'6laboration des strat6gies de la Nouvelle-Ecosse en matibre de ressources
naturelles adopties en ao0t 2011, plus pr6cis6ment la strat6gie concernant les
for6ts en vertu de la Environmental Goals and Sustainable Prosperity Act (loi
sur les objectifs environnementaux et la prosp6rit6 durable). Les conclusions
montrent que, comparativement & divers processus d'6laboration de politiques
utilisds ailleurs au Canada, le processus suivi en Nouvelle-8cosse p~chait contre
le principe de precaution (gestion adaptative) et sur le plan du consensus
entre les parties prenantes (ndgociations ax6es sur la collaboration). Lauteur
pr6conise qu'. l'avenir, la province utilise des processus strat6giques analytiques
et politiques plus forts pour 6/aborer ses politiques.
* Professor, School for Resource and Environmental Studies, Dalhousie University. In the interest
of full disclosure, I, the author, have been a forest-policy scholar for some twenty-five years, almost
all of that time as a professor. I designed and led the process to develop a comprehensive forest-
policy framework in Ontario in the early 1990s (described below), and have designed and led several
processes for forest decision-making since that time. During my past fourteen years in Nova Scotia,
I have chaired the Voluntary Planning Forest and Natural Resources Sector committees, the Forest
Technical Advisory Committee to the Minister of Natural Resources, and the Nova Forest Alliance. I
helped facilitate the Colin Stewart Forest Forum, and was consulted by the Phase I Voluntary Planning
group charged with the first public consultations associated with strategy development.
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Introduction
Contemporary resource and environmental policy development by
democratic governments is usually characterized by a participatory
process for citizens and organizational stakeholders.' Design and scope
of such processes depends on a host of factors such as the nature of
the policy to be developed, urgency of the policy need, orientation and
style of the government convening the process, and expectations and
customs of those to be consulted. Levels of participation, ranging from no
participation at all, through tokenistic input, to stakeholder partnerships
and full citizen control, have been described in the literature since the
1960s.2 Much guidance is available to help policy-developers design and
1. PV Ellefson, Forest Resources Policy: Process, Participants, and Programs (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1992); and FW Cubbage, J O'Laughlin & CS Bullock III, Forest Resource Policy (New
York: John Wiley & Sons, 1993).
2. See, e.g., SR Amstein, "A ladder of citizen participation" (1969) 35 Journal of the American
Institute of Planners 216.
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implement strong processes, especially in relation to natural resources and
the environment.3
In Nova Scotia, the Environmental Goals and Sustainable
Prosperity Act was enacted in 2007.1 Among its twenty-one goals was
the following commitment: "(u) the Province will adopt strategies to
ensure the sustainability of the Province's natural capital in the areas of
forestry, mining, parks and biodiversity by the year 2010." The strategy
development pursuant to this goal included more than three years of
participatory process, culminating with the publication of The Path We
Share: A Natural Resources Strategy for Nova Scotia, 2011-2020.1 The
strategy document addresses the four areas named in the Act: forestry,
mining, parks, and biodiversity.
In this paper, the account and analysis focuses on forestry to evaluate
the degree to which the Nova Scotia forest-strategy process measured up
to best practice for development of natural resources policies. The linked
concepts of adaptive management and principled negotiation, as described
by Lee,' are used to characterize a strong policy-development process.
The author contends that the strategy-development process in Nova Scotia
lacked significant elements of best practice in relation to the style and
quality of both the analytical and participatory processes used. The paper
begins with a summary account of what happened during the strategy-
development process, based on the direct experience of the author and
from public documents. The paper then outlines some fundamentals of
effective policy process as offered by Lee and exemplified by experiences
elsewhere (New Brunswick and Ontario). Finally, the author highlights
where the Nova Scotia strategy-development process could have been
stronger.
3. See, e.g., PJ Johnson & PN Duinker, Beyond Dispute: Collaborative Appmaches to Resolving
Natural Resources and Environmental Conflicts (Thunder Bay: School of Forestry, Lakehead
University, 1993); Ellefson, supra note 1; Cubbage, O'Laughlin & Bullock, supra note 1; GN Cormick
et al, Building Consensus for a Sustainable Future: Putting Principles into Practice (Ottawa: National
Round Table on the Environment and the Economy, 1996); and TM Beckley, JR Parkins & SRJ
Sheppard, Public Participation in Sustainable Forest Management: A Reference Guide (Edmonton:
Sustainable Forest Management Network, University ofAlberta, 2006).
4. Environmental Goals and Sustainable Prosperity Act, SNS 2007, c 7 [EGSPA].
5. (Nova Scotia: Nova Scotia Department of Natural Resources, 2011) [The Path We Share].
6. KN Lee, Compass and Gyroscope: Integrating Science and Politics for the Environment
(Washington, DC: Island Press, 1993).
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I. The Nova Scotia natural resources strategy of2011: process,
participants, products
The Government of Nova Scotia published a forest policy in 1986 and
replaced it, in practice, with an unpublished strategy in the late 1990s.'
With the new millennium, it was high time for policy refreshment given
the forest-sector transformations taking place in the province and across
the country. Preliminary discussions about a process to renew the forest
strategy revolved around a design for two parallel conversation tables: one
on economic dimensions and one on environmental and social dimensions.
Concerns over the proposed process, leadership, and membership, raised
by environmental advocates to the Minister, led to abandonment of that
plan and the creation of a much larger process to renew strategies for
minerals, biodiversity (formerly wildlife), provincial parks, and forests.
The consequent strategy-development process was designed in
three phases: (a) Phase I, a broad public consultation to get a sense of
citizen priorities and issues (implemented 2008-2009); (b) Phase II, a
narrower consultation involving expert panels and engagement of invited
stakeholders (implemented 2009-2010); and (c) Phase III, an inside-
government development of the final strategic directions (implemented
2010-2011).1 Phase III of the process was limited to government staff and
not publicly documented.
Voluntary Planning (VP), a long-standing arm's-length public-
engagement agency of the Government of Nova Scotia, was tasked with
implementing Phase I of the strategy development. VP struck a seven-
person Natural Resources Citizen Engagement Committee to commence
the consultations. Its stated objectives were to listen to Nova Scotians'
visions and values associated with natural resources and to gather those
visions and values to share with the government.9 Twenty-seven community
meetings were conducted across the province, three workshops conducted,
and some six hundred submissions received. The final report, entitled
Our Common Ground: The Future of Nova Scotia 's Natural Resources,0
identified five key values associated with management of Nova Scotia's
natural resources:
7. Forestry-A New Policy for Nova Scotia (Halifax: Department of Lands and Forests, 1986).
8. The Path We Share, supra note 5.
9. Natural Resources Citizen Engagement Committee, The Future of Nova Scotia s Natural
Resources: What We Heard (Halifax: Voluntary Planning, 2008).
10. Natural Resources Citizen Engagement Committee, Our Common Ground: The Future ofNova
Scotia's Natural Resources (Halifax: Voluntary Planning, 2009).
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Sustainability. Nova Scotians want a natural resources strategy that can
provide for them today without negatively affecting the culture, society,
environment, and economy of generations to come. They want more
jobs in rural areas, jobs based on sound ecological principles.
Diversity. Nova Scotians believe diversity is an essential element of
a resilient economy, a vibrant ecology, thriving communities, and a
healthy way of life.
Collaboration. Nova Scotians want the Department of Natural Resources
to play a leadership role in bringing together the different views about
natural resource management. They also want to continue to be part of
the decision making process.
Transparency. Nova Scotians value an open, clear, and easily understood
decision making process. They want to know the rationale behind
decisions.
Informed decision making. Nova Scotians want the Department of
Natural Resources to use the best available information pertaining to
science, economics, citizen values, and community and traditional
knowledge when making resource-management decisions. They also
want to be kept informed so that they can better contribute to the decision
making process.
Phase II was led by a steering panel composed of three high-profile
citizens of the province: Constance Glube, retired provincial chief justice;
Joe Marshall, of the Union of Nova Scotia Indians; and Allan Shaw, chair
of the Shaw Group of companies. Each of the four strategic theme areas-
forests, parks, biodiversity, minerals-was to have its own expert panel
that would feed recommendations to the steering panel. The Department
of Natural Resources widely advertised the opportunity for forest experts
to self-nominate for one of three positions on a Phase-II expert panel.
The expert panel on forests included: Bob Bancroft, retired provincial-
government biologist; Donna Crossland, ecologist with Parks Canada;
and Jonathan Porter, industrial woodlands manager with Bowater Mersey
Paper Company.
Over a period of a few months late in 2009 and early in 2010, the panel
called a series of experts to share their views on a range of high-profile
issues. 12 The panel's two reports to the Steering Committee were released
in May 2010-one written by Bancroft and Crossland and the other by
11. The Path We Share, supra note 5, Appendix A.
12. The process used by the panel to develop the consequent recommendations was not made public,
and therefore cannot be the subject of comment.
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Porter.I It was clear that the panel could not reach consensus on the topics,
tone, and direction of its policy recommendations. Equally surprising was
that each report contained a large number of recommendations (113 in the
Bancroft-Crossland report, 62 in the Porter report), ranging in target topic
from the ultra-strategic (e.g., province-wide forest research funding and
programming) to the ultra-tactical (e.g., including carbon budgets in forest
modelling and maintaining the Woodlot Owner of the Year program).
There was, however, neither strategic insight-in the sense of higher-order
direction-setting-nor consensus among the panellists.
The disagreement between the two sets of recommendations from
Phase II was sufficiently disconcerting to the Forest Products Association
of Nova Scotia that it commissioned an independent peer review of the two
forest-panel reports. Robert Wagner of the University of Maine completed
that review. Wagner harshly criticized both the strategy process and the
panel reports. In a particularly telling passage he stated:
After reviewing the documents making up Nova Scotia's Natural
Resources Strategy related to forests and forestry, however, I was largely
dismayed at the process for making such crucial recommendations about
the future management of Nova Scotia's forests. It was difficult to not
come to the conclusion that forest management strategic policy making
and planning in Nova Scotia are broken! Most troubling was that no
evidence was offered by the Expert Panel or the Steering Panel that a
critical analysis of the likely impacts of any of their recommendations
was conducted as part of the Phase II analysis. Many of these
recommendations are likely to have profound impacts on the future
composition and structure of private and public forests in the province
that will have significant effects on wood supplies, the forest-based
economy, land use, wildlife habitat, and a wide range of other ecological
considerations over many decades. 4
Phase II was capped with the Steering Panel's report," which
addressed strategic priorities on leadership, citizen and stakeholder
engagement, legislative renewal and compliance improvement, research
capacity and knowledge sharing, education, and collaboration. Also
13. B Bancroft & D Crossland, Restoring the Health ofNova Scotia's Forests: A Panel ofExpertise
Report on Forests to the Steering Panel (Halifax: Department of Natural Resources, 2010); and, J
Porter, The Roots ofSustainable Prosperity in Nova Scotia: An Expert Panel Report on Forests to the
Steering Panel (Halifax: Department of Natural Resources, 2010).
14. RG Wagner, Review of Reports and Recommendations Relating to Forests/Forestry as Part
of Phase H of Nova Scotia's Natural Resources Strategy Development Process (Truro, NS: Forest
Products Association of Nova Scotia, 2010) [emphasis in original].
15. CR Glube, J Marshall & A Shaw, Report of the Steering Panel, Phase II Natural Resources
Strategy (Halifax: Department of Natural Resources, 2010) online: <http://www.gov.ns.ca/natr/
strategy/pdf/phase2-reports/Steering%20PanelFINAL.pdf> [Report Phase fl].
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included were one or more pages specifically about each of the four
strategy areas covered. Interestingly, while the Steering Panel presented
recommendations on minerals, parks, and biodiversity directly from
the respective expert panels, it developed its own recommendations for
forests. These recommendations, ten in all, addressed integrated resource
management, the Code of Forest Practice,'I regulation of specific forest-
management tools, best management practices, and biomass for electricity
generation. The recommendations included neither explanatory statements
(essential forjustification), nor details on implementation. Also, they were
not strategic, hitting individual volatile public issues rather than outlining
overall directions for the resource and the forest sector. Exemplifying
these traits were the recommendations associated with regulation of forest
practices that suggested the province:
* Require management plans prior to cutting on all public and private
lands.
* Allow clear-cutting by permit only.
* Allow use of pesticides and herbicides by permit only.
* Stop whole-tree harvesting as a forestry practice, except for
Christmas tree farms. 7
II. Framework for evaluating policy-development processes
In his seminal work, Compass and Gyroscope: Integrating Science
and Politics for the Environment, Kai Lee provides a most elegant and
persuasive framework for the pursuit of sustainable development.'" Science
and politics are welded together to provide the tools necessary to see and
choose promising paths for resource and environmental management and
policy. The essence of Lee's compass, the science of adaptive management,
is well illustrated with an example from New Brunswick. The foundation
of Lee's gyroscope, the politics of principled or bounded negotiation
and civic engagement, is demonstrated with an example from Ontario.
Two process vignettes covering experiences in these two provinces
(New Brunswick and Ontario) evidence both technical and participatory
strengths.
I6. Nova Scotia, Code ofForest Practice: A Frameworkfor the Implementation of
Sustainable Forest Management (2012) online: <http://gov.ns.ca/natr/forestry/>.
17. Report Phase II, supra note 15 at 23.
18. Lee, supra note 6.
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1. Technical elements: New Brunswick's Task Force on Forest Diversity
and Wood Supply
a. Adaptive management
Adaptive management was heralded in the late 1970s as a promising
approach to reduce uncertainty in the management of large resource and
environmental systems. 9 Walters and Lee added further explanation
and encouragement to the approach20 and agencies across the USA 2
and Canada22 have since espoused the approach within their mandates.
Experience shows both successful applications23 and less-than-successful
attempts to adopt the adaptive management approach.24
To date, there remain proponents25 and management systems 26
espousing the virtues of adaptive management. At the heart of adaptive
management is a cycle including: (a) formal prediction of expected
resource outcomes under alternative management regimes, 27 (b) rigorous
monitoring of environmental conditions once a strategy is chosen
and implemented,28 and (c) explicit comparisons of expectations and
realities to uncover errors and design appropriate further investigation
and interventions. 29 Rarely is the cycle fully completed. In the predictive
phase, analysts are often reluctant to commit, preferring qualitative-and
therefore usually untestable-statements about future expectations.3 0
19. CS Holling, ed, Adaptive Environmental Assessment and Management (Toronto: John Wiley &
Sons, 1978).
20. CJ Walters, Adaptive Management of Renewable Resources (New York: Macmillan Publishing,
1986); and Lee, supra note 6.
21. See, e.g., GH Stankey & B Shindler, Adaptive Management Areas: Achieving the Promise,
Avoiding the Peril-USDA Forest Service General Technical Report PNW-GTR-394 (Portland, OR:
Pacific Northwest Research Station, 1997).
22. See, e.g., B Taylor, L Kremsater & R Ellis, Adaptive Management ofForests in British Columbia
(Victoria: British Columbia Ministry of Forests, 1997).
23. See, e.g., Holling, supra note 19; and Lee, supra note 6.
24. RJ McClain & RG Lee, Adaptive management: promises and pitfalls (1996) 20 Environmental
Management 437; and GH Stankey et al, "Adaptive Management and the Northwest Forest Plan"
(2003) 191:1 Journal of Forestry 40.
25. See, e.g., PN Duinker & LM Trevisan, "Adaptive management: progress and prospects for
Canadian forests" in V Adamowicz et al, eds, Towards Sustainable Management ofthe Boreal Forest:
Emulating Nature, Minimizing Impacts and Supporting Communities (Ottawa: National Research
Council Press, 2003) 857.
26. See, e.g., Canadian Standards Association, Sustainable Forest Management-CAN/CSA-Z809-08
(Mississauga: CSA, 2009).
27. PN Duinker & GL Baskerville, "A systematic approach to forecasting in environmental impact
assessment" (1986) 23 Journal of Environmental Management 271.
28. PN Duinker, "Ecological effects monitoring in environmental impact assessment: what can it
accomplish?" (1989) 13 Environmental Management 797.
29. Duinker & Trevisan, supra note 25.
30. GE Beanlands & PN Duinker, "An ecological framework for environmental impact assessment"
(1984) 18 Journal of Environmental Management 267.
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This is tragic, given that monitoring systems cannot be designed with
confidence without explicit hypotheses that drive consideration of the
nature and strength of data-collection efforts.
Prediction in this context does not mean making one forecast and
adopting it as the only expected outcome. Rather, it means making
contingent statements about expected outcomes given specific decisions
on action sets and the relationships among system components. When
resource systems are amenable to quantitative description and there are
some reasonably firm ideas about how they might respond to alternative
action sets, it behoves us to model those responses to check whether
specific policies might lead to desirable outcomes. The objective of
foresight is decision-option insight.
b. Example: New Brunswick
The New Brunswick Task Force on Forest Diversity and Wood Supply
described a helpful example of foresight in policy development in its report
entitled Management Alternatives for New Brunswick ' Public Forest.31
Thom Erdle of the University of New Brunswick chaired the task force and
led the group of nine New Brunswick citizens through a technical process
that resulted in a series of long-term forecasts for nineteen indicators in
response to potential adoption of eight alternative management strategies.
The objective of the exercise was "to develop a set of realistic and practical
forest management alternatives that would encompass a broad range of
ways by which to manage New Brunswick's public forest."32
Those alternatives were to:
* generate increasing yields of a wider variety of commercial tree
species and products to provide a diverse raw material base enabling
wood-based forest industries to capitalize on current and future
market opportunities;
* maintain the diversity and important ecological features of New
Brunswick's Acadian Forest so that timber management practices
do not simplify the forest through excessive reductions in species
diversity and the abundance of old and biologically complex forest
conditions characteristic of the natural Acadian Forest; and
* be characterized in terms of their probable environmental, social,
and economic consequences to allow a reasonably full evaluation of
their relative performance.
31. New Brunswick Task Force on Forest Diversity and Wood Supply, Management Alternatives for
New Brunswick's Public Forest (Fredericton: New Brunswick, 2008) online: New Brunswick <http://
www.gnb.ca/cnb/promos/forest/pdf/ErdleReport-e.pdf>.
32. Ibid at 2.
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The task force was not asked to make recommendations about how to
manage the forest, but rather to inform the decision-making process
by identifying and characterizing workable forest management
alternatives.33
This is an excellent example of the technical analysis that should underlie
forest-policy development. It provides the necessary technical insight to
assess potential long-term consequences of strategic forest-management
alternatives for New Brunswick's Crown land. If observers disagree with
the results, the onus is on them to offer up their own forecasts. If observers
accept the results as a plausible representation of long-term outcomes,
then there is a firm basis for debating respective values and the relative
desirability of the alternative outcomes. The New Brunswick exercise
delivered the decision-option insight required by the project convenors.
2. Political Elements: Ontario 's Forest Policy Panel
a. Principled negotiation
Lee espoused the process of principled negotiation as the appropriate way
to address conflict among natural-resource stakeholders and interests.3 4
Principled negotiation has been used for many decades in settings such
as management-labour disputes, and became increasingly used in many
forms and forums related to environment and natural resources beginning
in the late 1970s.11 Spurred primarily by the publication of Our Common
Future there has been a proliferation of manuals and guides on principled
negotiation. 6
Negotiation processes for resources and the environment are premised
on the notion that command-and-control decision-making is largely
inappropriate in contemporary society for matters of public policy; a strict
diet of representative democracy is similarly inappropriate for such issues.
Participatory democracy, where a variety of interests can participate fully
in the decision-making processes, is what Canadians generally expect.
Voting processes wherein the majority rules frequently leave many parties
feeling disenfranchised, whereas in negotiation all parties usually commit
33. Ibid at 2.
34. Lee, supra note 6.
35. GW Cormick, "Theory and practice of environmental mediation" (1980) 2 Environmental
Professional 24; and Johnson & Duinker, supra note 3.
36. World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1987). Also see, for example, Commission on Resources and Environment. "Dispute
Resolution" in Provincial Land Use Strategy, vol 4 (Victoria: British Columbia, 1995); J Hansen,
Table Manners for Round Tables, 5th ed (Summerland, BC: The Green Group, 1995); and Cormick
et al, supra note 3. Other guidance materials abound: see, e.g., TJ Sullivan, Resolving Development
Disputes through Negotiation (New York: Plenum Press, 1984); and LJ Spencer, Winning Through
Participation (Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1989Y.
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to support outcomes even if their full suite of hopes and demands is not
met. Decision processes in Canada's model forests are prime examples of
the positive attributes of negotiation."
Participatory decision-making processes have progressed beyond
input on outcomes alone. While stakeholders are frequently satisfied
with the knowledge that their voices have been heard and their opinions
considered by decision-makers, with increasing frequency they want more
than just this level of participation." Contemporary process convenors
find themselves not only engaging interested parties more often and with
greater intensity, but also note that those parties want to influence the very
design of the engagement process. Partnership arrangements, where parties
with legal authority to make decisions are willing to share the shaping of
those decisions with other parties, are increasingly abundant in relation to
Canada's resources and the environment.39 Negotiated solutions seem to
have more endurance than administered solutions4 0 and stakeholders seem
more insistent regarding their involvement in negotiation processes.
b. Example: Ontario
One can readily argue for solution-seeking in resource and environmental
problem-solving based on inclusive, consensus-seeking deliberations.
When, however, the stakeholder set is vast, (e.g., the entire citizenry of a
province) the process can rarely be all-inclusive. Such was the situation
faced by the Ontario Forest Policy Panel, commissioned by the Minister of
Natural Resources to work with the people of the province in developing
a comprehensive forest-policy framework. 4 1 The Panel designed and
facilitated its own consultation process, with numerous layers of idea
generation and review. The program included a wide variety of means
of engagement, including newsletters, press releases, a tabloid discussion
paper, one-on-one stakeholder meetings, an invitation for submissions or
phone calls, peer workshops, agency workshops, community workshops,
special events (e.g., a sub-sector hearing), an inter-ministry coordinating
committee, and review of a draft report. More than three thousand people
participated in various process opportunities. In response to the Panel's
37. L LaPierre, "Canada's Model Forest Program" (2002) 78 Forestry Chronicle 613.
38. Johnson & Duinker, supra note 3; and PN Duinker, "Public participation's promising progress:
advances in forest decision-making in Canada" (1998) 77:2 Commonwealth Forestry Review 107.
39. Ibid.
40. JM Wondolleck, Public Lands Conflict and Resolution: Managing National Forest Disputes
(New York: Plenum Press, 1988); and JE Crowfoot & JM Wondolleck, eds, Environmental Disputes:
Community Involvement in Conflict Resolution (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1990).
41. Ontario Forest Policy Panel, Diversity: Forests, Peoples, Communities-Report of the Ontario
Forest Policy Panel (Toronto: Ministry of Natural Resources, 1993).
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work, the Government of Ontario published its Policy Framework for
Sustainable Forests, much of which was drawn directly from the Panel's
final report.42
Particularly successful were the Panel's community consultations,
including the more than twenty-five workshops with both ministry staff
and local citizens. The panellists designed each workshop to attempt group
consensus on specific themes, outcomes of which would then be used to
launch discussions at subsequent workshops. In essence, each workshop
was designed not only as an independent problem-solving exercise but
also as an interdependent link in a yearlong process of strategy-building.
3. Process examples combining incisive technical analysis with
principled negotiation
There are numerous examples of policy-development processes in Canada
and abroad that have combined strong technical analysis with a strong
participatory process. Two examples are worthy of description. 43
The Wabakimi Park Boundary Committee was established by the
Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources in 1992 to develop, through
consensus, a recommendation for a new boundary for the wilderness park.
The sixteen members engaged in a negotiations process with technical
analysis based on evaluation of the costs and benefits of alternative park
configurations on eleven key indicators. To support the evaluation, the
landscape was delineated into approximately sixty small watersheds that
could be analyzed independently against the indicators." The landscape
analysis was pivotal, allowing committee members to understand their
opportunities and trade-offs under a range of boundary alternatives. While
the Committee did not reach full consensus after two and a half years
of deliberations, in hindsight members agreed that the process of seeking
consensus was essential in reaching a useful outcome. The Government
of Ontario expanded the park in 1997 from 155,000 ha to almost 890,000
ha.45
The second example, EGSPA, committed the Government of Nova
Scotia to increasing the province's protected-areas system to 12% of the
42. Ontario, Policy Framework for Sustainable Forests (Sault Ste Marie: Ministry of Natural
Resources, 1994); and Ontario Forest Policy Panel, supra note 41.
43. 1 served as a process facilitator and technical advisor in both these processes.
44. PN Duinker et al, "Using caribou knowledge in expanding the Wabakimi protected area" (1998)
10 Rangifer Special Issue 183.
45. Ontario Parks, Wabakimi & Kopka River (Ontario: Ministry of Natural Resources, 2003). online:
Ontario Legislative Assembly <http://www.ontla.on.callibrary/repository/mon/8000/243645.pdf> at
1.
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landbase by 2015.46 The 12% goal was well entrenched across Canada
even in the late twentieth century and conservationists in Nova Scotia
had been working on this agenda for many years. Frustrated by a lack
of progress early in the twenty-first century, protected-areas stakeholders,
with encouragement from ardent conservationist Colin Stewart, agreed
to move forward collectively. The Colin Stewart Forest Forum (Forum)
represented a negotiation table populated by environmental, industrial, and
government interests dedicated to charting a consensus-based path toward
completion of Nova Scotia's protected-areas network. A memorandum of
understanding among the parties set the broad parameters of engagement,
and ground rules were established. Over a period of almost five years,
the parties undertook detailed negotiations and technical investigations
on protection priorities and wood-supply mitigation opportunities. The
Forum filed its report with the Government of Nova Scotia in November
2009,47 and the Government is implementing further protection measures,
according to its EGSPA commitment, based largely on the group's work.4 8
III. Evaluation of the Nova Scotia process to develop the forest strategy
of201149
1. Technical elements
Policy actions have consequences. If those consequences are amenable to
quantification, they can usually be forecast using reasonably sophisticated
forest-modelling tools, similar to those used by the New Brunswick
Task Force on Forest Diversity and Wood Supply. 0 When consequences
are difficult to quantify-or are simply not quantitative-qualitative
scenario techniques can be used instead. What is essential, whether formal
modelling is conducted or not, is for policy analysts (and indeed all policy
proponents) to engage in some form of formal impact assessment. Insight
on the potential consequences of alternative policy options is essential.
Without impact analysis, choice among policy alternatives becomes
merely an exercise of determining who has the strongest arm.
At least two modelling initiatives dedicated to shedding light on specific
elements of forest strategy were undertaken in Nova Scotia. One was
designed to elucidate the potential wood-supply ramifications of reducing
46. EGSPA, supra note 4, s 4(2)(a).
47. Colin Stewart Forest Forum Steering Committee, Colin Stewart Forest Forum: Final Report
(Stewiacke, NS: Nova Forest Alliance, 2009).
48. PN Duinker, K DeGooyer & C Miller, The Colin Stewart Forest Forum: an innovative approach
to protected areas planning in Nova Scotia (2012) [submitted to Conservation and Society].
49. The Path We Share, supra note 5.
50. Supra note 31.
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the practice of clear-cutting in Nova Scotia." The second investigated the
wood-supply implications of alternative rates of participation of woodlot
owners in the timber market.52 Additionally, Woodbridge Associates
undertook an economic impact analysis of timber management and supply
changes on the province's forest-products industry."
Such works, although insightful in their own right, hardly constitute
any kind of comprehensive analysis of the consequences of implementing
a package of reforms in Nova Scotia's forest strategy. Perhaps far more
impact analysis was done as part of the confidential Phase III work. If
so, plaudits to the government. Such analyses should, however, be
participatory in the sense that non-state actors should have access to the
construction, implementation, and results of analytical work. This was
certainly not the case for Nova Scotia's forest strategy.
2. Political elements
In this author's experience, consensus processes are more effective than,
and at least as efficient as, other kinds of decision-making processes.
When consulted early on by Nova Scotia's Natural Resources Public
Consultation Committee about process design, the author urged the
Committee to implement a consensus-seeking process based on problem-
solving workshops. That approach was not adopted. Instead, the Committee
simply "heard from the people" in the age-old fashion of listening as one
speaker or writer after another shared their personal concerns. It may be
possible to identify some common ground among numerous individual
contributors, but the approach is not consensus-based. The only consensus
achieved at this level was among Committee members (of course, that in
itself may well be a great achievement).
Hearing from the public in this manner is not a "bad thing" per se.
Arguably, it should be seen as a necessary but insufficient element of
an overall consultative process. Considering the complexity of natural-
resource and environmental problems, gauging the public pulse through
written and oral presentations generates rather shallow information on
public sentiment and preferences and cannot be expected to deliver robust
and innovative solutions. To achieve the latter end, consensus-seeking
problem-solving exercises are needed.
51. Department of Natural Resources, Woodbridge Wood Supply Scenarios: Clearcut Harvest Policy
Analysis (Halifax: Nova Scotia, 2011).
52. Department of Natural Resources, Non-Industrial Private Non-Participation Scenarios: Crown
Lands Forest Model Online Reporting & Statistics for Potential Wood Supply (Halifax: Nova Scotia,
2011).
53. Woodbridge Associates, Economic Impact Analysis of Timber Management & Supply Changes
on Nova Scotia's Forest Industry (Halifax: Department of Natural Resources, Nova Scotia, 2011).
In Search of "Compass and Gyroscope"
Phase II of the forest-strategy process clearly did not achieve
consensus even among the three people on the panel, as evidenced by
the production of majority and minority reports. It is unknown to those of
us outside government whether any consensus was achieved among staff
who contributed to the formation of the final strategy. Because government
departments, and indeed majority-holding governments themselves, can
operate on an authoritarian basis, the degree of internal consensus could
rest anywhere along the spectrum of agreement. The natural resources
strategy is in essence a government-issued policy decree that clearly
anticipates the provincial governance system to uphold and implement it.
Given the demonstrated power of consensus-seeking processes to
deliver enduring solutions to resource and environmental problems, one
can continue to question why such processes were not implemented for
the forest strategy of Nova Scotia. As noted, consensus-seeking processes
may frequently take more time and resources than initially planned,
but that must always take a back seat to effectiveness where parties at
conflict are brought to a constructive peace. Consensus also results in all-
party commitment to implementation of the ultimate agreement; neither
occurred with the Nova Scotia forest strategy.
Conclusion
The Nova Scotia process to develop a new forest strategy failed on two
counts: (a) it was not supported by a comprehensive examination of future
potential states of key forest values (represented by some set of criteria
and indicators) under alternative forest-policy directions; and, (b) it did
not reach any meaningful consensus among forest-sector stakeholders to
establish policy directions. That said, the strategy, in its implementation,
might not be a failure: one can, of course, arrive at a good strategy largely
by luck, intuition, or coercion, and hopefully this will be the case.
Whether the strategy will have demonstrably positive impacts on Nova
Scotia's forests and the forest sector will depend not only on its faithful
implementation and actualization of the hoped-for positive impacts, but
also the public's ability to discern those impacts among the myriad of other
influences on those same forest values. At the very time the strategy is
beginning its implementation journey, the forest-products processing and
manufacturing sector of the economy is undergoing profound change.54
Evidence from a variety of sources suggests that woodlot owners are
54. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Natural Resources, Canada's Forestry Industry:
Recognizing the Challenges and Opportunities (2008).
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increasingly unwilling to harvest timber for the market." Climate change
continues unabated, global markets go their own ways, our energy future
is incredibly uncertain, and so on. Incisive monitoring and analysis are
crucial for gaining insight on strategy success.
It is, to be sure, a complicated situation. Perhaps we should view the
strategy as the best outcome given the political processes designed to
deliver it. Thus, it should be seen as the most interim of interim measures.
If others agree that both the technical and the political elements of strategy
development could be much stronger in this province, then Nova Scotians
must collectively begin to discuss and develop stronger processes. In
this context, let us assume that EGSPA delivered admirable targets and
milestones for sustainable prosperity in Nova Scotia. We got a new forest
strategy as per EGSPA directions, but the process was unnecessarily
fractious and the result weak and unsupported on both technical and
political grounds. Perhaps EGSPA should specify (or, rather, should have
specified) some elements of strong process that would bias for, not against,
technically defensible and politically supported solutions. On technical
grounds, strategic environmental assessment offers much hope in terms
of explicit analysis of potential future outcomes of policy alternatives.
On political grounds, consensus-seeking negotiation among stakeholders
holds the most promise.
Our forests deserve better. Forest-management problems in Nova
Scotia, as elsewhere, are "wicked."56 Such "wicked" problems are best
tackled using the transdisciplinary imagination." We have eight short
years until 2020 when the forest strategy will need a successor. Let's get
started!
55. L Sanderson & PN Duinker, "Woodland Owners and the Forests of Nova Scotia: Results of
a Survey" (Halifax: School for Resource and Environmental Studies, Dalhousie University, 2012)
[unpublished, copy on file with author].
56. GM Allen & EM Gould Jr, "Complexity, wickedness, and public forests" (1986) 84:4 Journal of
Forestry 20.
57. VA Brown, JA Harris & JY Russell, eds, Tackling Wicked Problems Through the Transdisciplinary
Imagination (London: Earthscan, 2010).
